Wage bargaining and quality competition by Bhattacharyya, Ranajoy & Saha, Bibhas
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Wage bargaining and quality competition
Ranajoy Bhattacharyya and Bibhas Saha
Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, school of economics, university of
east anglia
20. May 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30968/
MPRA Paper No. 30968, posted 19. May 2011 09:42 UTC
  
 
 
 
 
Wage bargaining and quality competition 
 
Ranajoy Bhattacharyya 
Indian Institute of Foreign Trade 
 
Bibhas Saha 
School of Economics, University of East Anglia 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
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Introduction 
 
Most wage bargaining models of oligopoly assume quantity competition and homogenous 
product (Dowrick, 1989, Bughin, 1995, Kraft 1998). This note introduces wage bargaining in 
a model of vertical differentiation where firms compete in both quality and prices 
(Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982). Wage, however, is not just a 
payment to the worker, but an input into the production of quality. We assume that the 
worker’s skill or effort is the crucial determinant of quality, and this effort can be induced 
through higher wage payment. A recent paper by Gabszewicz and Turrini (2000) has shown 
that the worker’s skill may play a decisive role in determining the product quality.  
 
If higher wage leads to higher quality, the firm producing high quality would like to pay a 
higher wage than the worker’s reservation level, whereas the firm producing the low quality 
variant would like to pay just the minimum. It is in the common interest of the firms to 
achieve the maximal differentiation leading to higher prices and profits. However, if the 
workers bargain over the wage, the resulting quality will be excessive relative to the firm’s 
most preferred levels. But for the competitiveness of the market it is the quality differential, 
rather than the individual levels of the quality, that matters most. How the bargaining powers 
of the workers in the two firms affect the competitiveness, is the main interest of this paper. 
 
It turns out that the two wages bear an asymmetric relation that has implications for the 
equilibrium quality differential and market competitiveness. From the point of view of the 
firm that chooses to produce high quality, two wages are strategic substitutes, while from the 
point of view of the other firm they are strategic complements. Two differently sloped wage 
reaction curves produce asymmetric comparative static results. Here, it may be noted that in 
standard quantity setting models, wages are generally strategic complements. In our model, 
an increase in the bargaining power of the worker in the low quality firm, reduces quality 
differential, increases price competitiveness, and reduces profit for both firms. In contrast, an 
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increase in the bargaining power of the worker in the high quality firm increases quality 
differential, reduces price competitiveness, and increases profit of the low quality firm. These 
results may have some implication for the co-ordination problem that is endemic to the 
models of quality competition.   
   
The basic model 
 
There are two firms indexed 1 and 2 engaged in a game of quality choice followed by price 
competition for a product that is vertically differentiated. Let the lower quality of the product 
be denoted as qL and the associated quantity demanded as XL. Similarly, the higher quality of 
the product is denoted as qH and its associated demand is XH. A typical consumer’s 
preference is: Ui = qi - (1/) pi ,  i=L,H where  the price of the i-th quality product is pi and  
is a parameter that can be interpreted as the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution 
between income and quality (see Tirole, 1988, p.96).
1
 There is a continuum of consumers 
who are uniformly distributed over an interval (, ). Assume 


  1 ; 

 10  . As is the 
case with such models, consumers will be segregated in terms of their purchase of the 
variety. There is a critical reservation value (C, say) above which all consumers consume the 
high quality variety and below which consumers consume the low quality variety: 
C
 = (pH – 
pL)/(qH – qL). Further assume that the entire market is served
2
.  
 
Having chosen different qualities in the first stage, firms engage in price competition in the 
second stage. For simplicity, we assume that the cost of production is fixed. It can be 
                                                          
1
  is a reservation value for the consumer depending on his income. In particular,  can be interpreted as the 
inverse of the marginal rate of substitution between income and quality:   = 1/U´(I) where I is the level of 
income. We assume U to be concave so that  rises with the level of income. 
 Consumers can be thought of being uniformly distributed between income levels (I,I). Assuming that 
the reservation value of the person with the highest (I) and lowest (I) incomes are and    respectively, the 
distribution can be stated in terms of the interval (, ). 
2
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 4 
imagined that one single worker is hired and he is willing to supply variable hours of work 
according to the firm’s demand, as long as a fixed wage is agreed upon. The analogy can be 
extended to a group of workers and a fixed wage bill, or any other non-labor fixed input as 
well. The wage is agreed upon in the first stage when the quality is also chosen.  
 
It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium prices are
3
: 
qpH 

)2(
3
1
 , qpL 

)1(
3
1
 resulting in profits HH Wqm  , LL Wqn    
where 2)2(
9
1

 m , 2)1(
9
1

 n  and q=qH-qL..   
Note that both the firms would prefer maximal differentiation as that would increase prices 
and profits. To what extent the differentiation can be enlarged will depend on the costs of 
choosing quality. Here we may be reminded that this game has generically two asymmetric 
Nash equilibria with firms implicitly coordinating on their asymmetric quality choice. If they 
end up with identical quality, their profits will be zero, a result of co-ordination failure.  
 
Now moving on to the first stage, we propose that the wage paid to the worker matters for the 
quality produced. The product quality is a direct result of worker’s superior efforts that can 
be induced through higher wages. This is a sort of efficiency wage. That worker’s skill can 
be a crucial determinant of quality and that the link between the wage paid to the worker and 
the quality achieved, have been emphasized in a recent paper by Gabszewicz and Turrini 
(2000). While they have explicitly modeled the link between skill, tasks and quality, we take 
a reduced form (monotonic) relation between wage and the quality.  
 
Let (qL,qH )  [


qq, ], and q=qL, if WW
0
, Hqq   if W
/W , and q=f(w), if W
0
<W< /W  
,f(.)>0, f(.)<0. The technology of producing quality is same for both the firms. It is only the 
different levels of the wage that will give rise to different qualities. In reality, however, 
firm’s choice of capital and R&D may also matter along with the workers’ efforts. But to 
highlight the role of the worker’s effort we make it the sole determinant of quality.   
                                                          
3See, for example Motta(1993) for a full characterization of this stage. 
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Further, we assume that the worker bargains over the wage. The bargaining process is 
captured through Nash bargaining. 
 
Wage bargaining 
Suppose the worker in firm i (i=1,2) wants to maximize his net income  (Wi-Wi ) where 

iW is 
his reservation wage. Let i be the bargaining power of the worker in firm i, and (1-i) be the 
bargaining power of firm i, vis-à-vis its worker  10  i  Each firm-worker pair bargains 
independently and simultaneously in the first stage of the game. The differences in the 
bargaining power and reservation wages of the two workers can be due to different 
institutional environments within which the firms operate.  
   
Assuming firms’ reservation profits to be zero, the bargaining problem in firm i is written as  
 Max   
 
i
i
iiii WWZ


 







1
       (1) 
 
At this stage we need to specify which firm is expected to produce the high quality variety 
and which firm the low quality variety. Suppose firm 1 will choose a quality level higher 
than that of firm 2. Both pairs will look forward to the second stage outcome and choose 
wages from the following equations given by the first order conditions of maximization: 
  ,01 
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
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



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i
i
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i
i
W
WW
W
Z






     i=1,2   (2) 
The second order condition for the high quality firm (firm 1) is easily satisfied by the 
concave f(W) function. But for the low quality firm we need to make an additional 
assumption. To ensure that it is satisfied at all 1 and 2 , we impose a restriction on the f(W) 
function
4
: 
                                                          
4
 It is required that   01
//
1 WZ  and   02
//
2 WZ at least locally for optimal 1W  and W2. 
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2
1
1
2
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1
1
1
"
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W
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



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






. It can be seen that 0
1
1 
W

  01 for   at the 
optimal  1W   and    01
//
2
1
1
2
 Wmf
W

. Thus given the concavity of the f (.) function the second 
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Assumption 1: f(W) is such that   -Wf”(W)/f’(W) < 1. 
 
In equation (2) we note that if i=0, firm 1 would choose * that solves W1 = mf’  1W -
1=0, and firm 2 will set W2=W2, as 2/W2=-(nf’(W2)+1) <0. Thus, when the worker does 
not have any bargaining power, firms set wages independent of each other, and (*,W2) 
gives the most profitable quality differentiation via the function f(W).  
 
But we are interested in the case of i>0. Two things become important: (I) the relative 
payoffs between the firm and the worker and (ii) the wage reaction curves. 
 
The relative payoffs: Equation (2) shows how iW  is to be set to maintain a balance between 
the firm’s and the worker’s payoff, taking the wage in the other firm as given. We may 
rewrite (2) as  
i/(Wi-Wi) = {(1-)/}[-i/Wi],  i=1,2      (2’) 
The ratio of the profit to net wages must be monotonically related to the ratio of the players’ 
bargaining powers {(1-)/}. This is a property of the Nash bargaining solution. In the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
order condition is easily satisfied for firm 1. Similarly, for firm 2 , 
      2//2222/2" 11)( WfWWnWnfWZ 



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
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1
1)(1
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1
2
/2
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2
/ Wnf
WfWW
Wf
   
The right hand side is bounded below by 1. The left hand side varies from zero  12 when  to 
 
 2
/
2
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

  12 when . Let us write the highest value of the LHS expression  as,  
 
  
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
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Which is a product of two terms. The first term is always a fraction. The second term is the elasticity 
of the ‘marginal quality’ function. We simply assume that this elasticity is less than unity. With this 
assumption the LHS will always be less than the RHS.  
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standard bargaining models where wage is a transfer to the worker, [-i/Wi]=1, and the 
ratio of the profit to wages will be exactly equal to the {(1-)/}. However, in the present 
context where wage has efficiency effects, [-i/Wi]1, and this is a source of bias in the 
ratio of the payoffs. For firm 1 (producing high quality), [-1/W1]=1-mf(W1) is positive 
but strictly less than 1. This can be seen from (2). Unless 1/W1=mf(W1)-1 <0, equation 
(2) will not be satisfied. On the other hand, for firm 2, [-2/W2]=nf(w2)+1>1. If we call [-
i/Wi] as a bias factor, then it is less than 1 for firm 1, and greater than 1 for firm 2. This 
means that the rent allocation in firm 1 is biased in favor of the worker and in firm 2 is biased 
in favor of the firm.  
 
Proposition 1: The profit wage ratio in firm 1 (producing high quality) is less than 
proportional, and in firm 2 (producing low quality) is more than proportional to the ratio of 
the bargaining powers of the firm and the worker.   
 
Wage reaction curves: Another important aspect of the bargaining solution is that W1 is no 
longer independent of W2. They will be determined from the two wage reaction functions 
given by (2). The wage reaction curve of firm 1 when it produces high quality, denoted 
as  12
1 ,WH , implicitly solves 
            011,; 12111/111121/1 







WWmfWmfWmfWWWWZ   
The wage reaction curve of firm 2 when it produces low quality, denoted as  21
2 ,WL   
implicitly solves, 
            011;; 22122/222212/2 







WWnfWnfWnfWWWWZ   
In other words,  
   0;;. 121/1  WZ H         (3) 
        0,;. 212/2  WZ L        (4) 
from which we obtain: 
 
//
1
2
/
1
2
/
1
//
12
/ 1
Z
Wmf
W
Z
ZW
H 






   <0       as   0//1 Z  
 8 
 
 
0
1
//
2
1
/
2
1
/
2
//
21
2


Z
Wnf
W
Z
ZW
L 




       as 0//2 Z . 
 
The wage reaction curve of firm 1 (high quality) is downward sloping, while the wage 
reaction curve of firm 2 (low quality) is upward sloping. This is true if 0, 21  , as is 
evident from the above expression. Thus, from the point of view of the high quality firm 
wages are strategic substitutes, while from the point of view of the low quality firm they are 
strategic complements. In models of quantity competition wages are typically strategic 
complements and that aspect is retained for the low quality firm because its primary aim is to 
choose the lowest quality and hence to lower the wage. For the high quality firm, the interest 
is exactly opposite. It wants to offer a higher wage and raise the quality. 
 
The intersection of the two reaction curves gives the equilibrium wages and qualities. 
However, a mild condition is needed to ensure that equilibrium always exists for all 
0, 21  . Relegating the discussion of it in the footnote, we move to the comparative static 
analysis
5
 
6
.   
                                                          
5. Note that the domain of  12
1 ;WH  is 












2
2
,WW for all 1  where 

2W  is implicitly defined by 
0, 2
*
1 




 
W . Then 2

W  is the highest level of 2W  that firm 1 needs to consider. 2

W is also the 
intercept of the 
1
H  curve, when W1=*, the lowest wage firm 1 will offer. Since  
1
H  is downward 
sloping and 
2
L  is upward sloping, we need to assume that the uppermost 
2
L  curve must start from 
a 2W  strictly less than 2

W .  As 0
2
2



 L , the uppermost 1L  curve must correspond to 12   in 
which case 02  . When W1=*, the uppermost
2
L  1W  curve has an intercept W2
+
. If  
 1, 2*12  LW  dose not exceed 2

W , then for all  1,0, 21  , the reaction curves will 
intersect and we have equilibrium.  
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Proposition 2: (a) With an increase in 1, both W1 and W2 increase, and the quality 
differential (q1-q2) also rises leading to higher prices. On the other hand, with an increase in 
2, W2 increases but W1 falls, and therefore the quality differential is reduced and prices fall. 
(b) With an increase in 2, 1 and 2 both fall, whereas with an increase in 1, only 1 will 
fall, but 2 will increase.     
        
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
  An improvement in the bargaining strength of the low quality firm (firm 2) will 
reduce the equilibrium wage in the high quality firm, but increase its own wage. This directly 
reduces the quality differential, increases price competitiveness and reduces the profit of the 
high quality firm, despite its first order fall in its wage. The asymmetric wage effects are 
entirely due to the strategic substituteness perceived by the high quality firm. On the other 
hand, an improvement in the bargaining strength of the worker in the high quality firm will 
have familiar symmetric effects on the wages as seen in models of strategic complementary 
wages. Although wages rise in both firms, the net result will be a further improvement in the 
quality differential, and less competition. But only the low quality firm will benefit from the 
increased differential, and the high quality firm will lose.  
 
We illustrate our results in Figure 1. In the lower half of the quadrant (where W1>W2) we 
depict the equilibrium where firm 1 produces high quality and firm 2 produces low quality. 
The upper half (where W2>W1) shows the other equilibrium where firms switch their places.  
To make our presentation a bit more concrete, take a particular form of the quality function: 
iii Wbq 2 .  
 
The wage reaction curve of firm 1 (when it produces high quality) is given by R
1
H and that of 
firm 2 by R
2
L. R
1
H starts from a height of W2
^
 and ends at a point in between * and W1
^
. * 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6
 Needless to say that there is another equilibrium where firm 2 produces the high quality good and firm 1 is the 
producer of low quality, keeping the same workers in their respective firms with unchanged bargaining powers. 
The characterization of the equilibrium is analogous and therefore, can be skipped. 
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is the firm’s most preferred wage and W1
^
 is the worker’s most preferred wage. For 
iii Wbq 2  it is straight forward to see that * = m
2
b
2
, W2
^
= */4 and 
W1
^
=*[1+{(W2/*)}]
2
.
7
  
 
In the case of both the worker and firm having positive bargaining powers the reaction curve 
must be a weighted average of the two extreme relations. This is precisely shown by R
1
H. It 
starts from the same height as W2
^
, but ends at a W1 greater than * but less than W1^. 
 
The reaction curve of firm 2 is given by the upward sloping curve R
2
L. The uppermost R
2
L 
starts from a point like W2
+
. In our example, W2
+
= *(n/m)2[-1+{1+(2m/n)}]2 .8 It can be 
shown that W2
+
  W1
^
.
9
 Hence the reaction curves always cross each other. With this 
alignment of the reaction curves, the comparative static results on wages become obvious.  
 
Conclusion 
Finally, to conclude we note that even though the firms are symmetric, they may face 
workers who may differ in terms of bargaining power. Then the two asymmetric equilibria 
will not be mirror images of each other. This gives rise to the possibility that one of them 
may Pareto dominate the other. If so, then the co-ordination problem may become less 
severe. Suppose firm 1 faces an extremely strong worker (1 close to 1), and firm 2 has a 
weak worker (2 close to zero). Now with this configuration if firm 1 produces high quality 
and firm 2 low quality, the joint profit is likely to be much higher than if they did otherwise. 
Firm 1 will always get very little profit, but firm 2’s profit will be substantially higher in the 
                                                          
7
 W1
^
 solves the equation 1(W1,W2,1=1)=0, or 022 1212111  WWkbWbk . For any given W2,  
W1
^
 (W2)= *[1+{(W2/*)}]
2
 
8
 W2
+
 solves the equation (W1,W2,=1)=0, or 2nb(W1-W2)-W2=0. For any given W1, W2
+
(W1) = 
*(n/m)2[-1+{1+2(W1)/(nb)}]
2
. 
9 By comparing the two expressions we see that the required inequality is satisfied if 4nm, or 4(1-
)2(2+)2. The right hand side is always increasing in  and the left hand side is decreasing in . At 
=0, the RHS is minimum and equal to the maximum value of the LHS. Since  [0,1), we can say 
that our condition is satisfied for the entire range of . 
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first equilibrium. The second equilibrium is worse for both. If the first equilibrium Pareto 
dominates the second one, then firms may be able to co-ordinate on it. In other words, if a 
firm has a stronger union, it is better suited to be the producer of the high quality variety-- a 
hypothesis that can be empirically examined.   
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
a) Suppose there exists a pair *2
*
1 ,WW  such that (3) and (4) are satisfied. That is  
     0;,,, 1212211
/
1  WWZ  
     0;,;, 2121212
/
2  WWZ  
By varying 1 , ceteris paribus, we obtain 
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Applying the Cramer’s rule it can be shown that  
D
Z
Z
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/
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1
*
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



for stability. Note that 
   011/111
1
/
1 







WmfWW
Z



  as   011
/ Wmf  and   01
/
2
1
/
2  Wnf
W
Z



. 
Thus we ascertain 0
1
*
1 

W
,  0
1
*
2 

W
. 
Next consider a ceteris paribus variation in 2 . Proceeding as before we derive  
 
D
W
ZZ
W 2
/
1
2
'
2
2
*
1 





              
D
Z
Z
W 2
/
1//
1
2
*
2 




      (D>0) 
Note,      01 22/2
2
/
2 




WnfWW
Z
 
  02
/
1
2
/
1  Wmf
W
Z



and therefore 0
2
*
1 

W
,  whereas 0
2
*
2 

W
 as 0
//
2 Z  
Next consider the quality differential:    21 WfWfqq LH   
It is straightforward to see, 
      0
2
*
2*
2
/
2
*
1*
1
/
2







 W
Wf
W
Wf
qq LH  unambiguously.  
But the sign of 
     
1
*
2*
2
/
1
*
1*
1
/
1 




 W
Wf
W
Wf
qq LH 

 is not obvious.  
However, when we substitute the relevant expressions of 
1
*
1

W
 and 
2
*
2

W
, we observe that
   
 
.
1
/
1
1 


 Zqq LH 

  
 
D
Wf *1
/
    nWfZ 2*2///2   
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The sign of the bracketed term determines the sign of 
 
1
 LH qq  , as the terms outside the 
bracket are all positive. Further expanding the bracketed term, we observe 
    22
/
22
///
2 1   WnfnWfZ  
   
 
11
2
/
2
//
2
2
2











 
Wf
WfW
W
WW
 
By Assumption 1, the bracketed term is positive. Hence, 
 
0
1



 LH qq  . 
The effects on the price are obvious from the fact that prices will rise (or fall) with an 
increase (or decrease) in the quality differential. 
b) The comparative static effects of i  on i  are straightforward.  
 
0
2
2
2
21
2
2 







 Wqq
n  since  
 
0
2
21 


 qq
  and  0
2
2 

W
 
Similarly,     0]1[
1
2
2
/
1
1
1
/
1
1 











 W
Wmf
W
Wmf  because   011
/ Wmf  and  
1
1

W
  and  
1
2

W
 are both positive. 
 
Next consider     
2
2
2
/
2
1
1
/
2
1 1





 W
Wmf
W
Wmf    . 
In this case the first term is positive as 0
2
1 

W
, while the second term is negative. 
 However, after substituting the relevant expressions, the above relation becomes 
 
 
    













1
//
111
/2
/
2
/
2
1
2
1 11 WmfWWWmf
D
WmfZ





 
The terms outside the bracket are all positive, but the ones inside the bracket are negative. 
Hence   0
2
1 


 
Now consider     
1
2
2
/
1
1
1
/
1
2 1





 W
Wnf
W
Wnf   
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Which also appears to be ambiguous.  Again we substitute the relevant expressions, and 
arrive at   
   
 
 











































111 2
/
2
22
2
2
/
2
//
1
/
1
/
1
2
1
2 Wnf
W
WW
W
Wf
Wf
D
WnfZ





 
Note that the terms outside the bracket are positive. Inside the bracket, the first term is a sum 
of a negative term and a positive term. However, by our Assumption 1 (or 0//2 Z  for all 2 ) 
it can be ascertained that the positive term will dominate, and the entire expression will be 
positive. Thus, 0
1
2 


. 
 
 
